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The Threefold objeCT of The sCIenTIfIC knowledge.
Pseudo-sCoTus and The lITeraTure on The 
meteorologiCa In fourTeenTh-CenTury ParIs
This paper studies the questions on Aristotle’s Meteorologica pub-
lished in the Wadding edition of Duns Scotus, attributed to Duns 
Scotus until the twentieth century and to Simon Tunsted since 
then. It provides a critical note on the literature and points out 
a contamination in the text: the fourth book of Pseudo-Scotus is 
an incomplete copy of Themon Judaeus. It then provides a doc-
trinal commentary of the question “Utrum de meteorologicis sit 
scientia” in the context of fourteenth-century epistemological dis-
cussions over the object of science. I show that the thesis advanced 
by Pseudo-Scotus, together with other Parisian masters, on the ob-
ject of science, is forged in response to the general rejection of Gre-
gory of Rimini’s theory of the total significate of the proposition.* 
Parisian natural philosophy in the fourteenth century has 
been the object of increased interest in medieval studies for 
over a century now, but not much scholarly attention has 
been paid yet to the distinct and sophisticated literature on 
Aristotle’s Meteorologica produced in this intellectual set-
ting. One can find a similar set of meteorological questions 
developed by major figures of this period, such as John Buri-
dan, Nicole Oresme, Albert of Saxony, and Themon Judaeus. 
With the exception of the latter, whose work was published 
in the sixteenth century, most of this material is still to be ed-
ited.1 It is notoriously hard to trace filiations between these 
* Research for this article was financed by the Fonds Wetenschappelijk 
Onderzoek Vlaanderen (FWO) and by the Fonds de la Recherche Scien-
tifique – Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles (FNRS). I thank Sorana Corneanu 
and Charles T. Wolfe for having corrected my English. 
1 For bibliographical indications and references to manuscripts, see 
O. Weijers, Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris  : textes 
et maîtres (ca. 1200–1500), 9 vols. (Turnhout: Brepols, 1994-2012), s.v. An 
edition of the first book by Buridan is available: S. Bages, Les Questiones 
super tres libros metheorum de Jean Buridan: Étude suivie de l’édition du 
livre I, PhD thesis (École nationale des chartes, 1986). I thank Ms Sylvie 
Bages–Biet for giving me access to her thesis. 
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figures, who were members of what has been characterized 
as a close intellectual network.2 Our grasp of the Meteorolog-
ica literature is made particularly difficult by the heavy con-
taminations encountered in the manuscript tradition, which 
raises many questions of intellectual paternity, even down 
to the level of particular questions. Aleksander Birkenmajer 
was the only scholar who had extensive knowledge of this lit-
erature, but unfortunately he never completed his projected 
book on the subject. His work from the beginning of the last 
century offers nevertheless the basis for our current knowl-
edge. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical overview 
of this literature and some new material elements regarding 
another work that belongs to this genre: the Meteorologico-
rum libri quatuor published by Luke Wadding in the sev-
enteenth-century edition of Duns Scotus, attributed to Duns 
Scotus until the twentieth century, and to Simon Tunsted 
since then. Pointing out yet another important contamina-
tion, we trace the intellectual paternity of Book IV of this 
text to Themon Judaeus. The author of the rest of the work 
remains unknown, but we can place its composition in the 
second half of the fourteenth century, in a Parisian setting 
influenced by Gregory of Rimini and John Buridan. 
This literature is important both for our efforts of recon-
structing the connections between these Parisian masters 
and for our knowledge of their scientific production. Opti-
cal issues developed in the third book constitute the main 
point of focus of such works, but they also discuss many other 
natural philosophical topics of interest such as the celestial 
influences, the nature of the sublunary bodies, the nature 
of light, causation and motion. Specific to the fourteenth 
century is an epistemological discussion that introduces the 
book, with little grounding in Aristotle’s text: is meteorol-
2 See J.M.M.H. Thijssen, “The Buridan School Reassessed. John Bu-
ridan and Albert of Saxony,” Vivarium 42 (2004): 18–42 and “The Debate 
over the Nature of Motion: John Buridan, Nicole Oresme and Albert of 
Saxony. With an Edition of John Buridan’s Quaestiones super libros Phys-
icorum, secundum ultimam lecturam, Book III, q. 7,” Early Science and 
Medicine 14 (2009): 186–210.
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ogy a science and if so, what is its object of study? While all 
authors mention the question of the object of meteorology 
within the wider framework of the question of the object of 
scientific knowledge, Pseudo-Scotus is the only author en-
countered who has an extensive and thorough treatment of 
the topic. We therefore complement the critical note with a 
commentary of question 1 of Pseudo-Scotus, “Utrum de im-
pressionibus meteorologicis sit scientia.” The presentation of 
this discussion aims to contribute to our knowledge of the 
reception of English nominalism in Paris. 
I. Critical note. Pseudo-Scotus and Themon Judaeus
1. It is known that the series of quaestiones on Aristotle’s 
Meteorologica published by Luke Wadding (1588–1657) in 
the seventeenth-century Franciscan edition of Duns Scotus 
is not the work of Duns Scotus, in spite of the qualification of 
the text as “secundum Scotum” in some of the manuscripts.3 
Suspicions over the paternity of the text were raised by Wad-
ding himself in a “Censura” that serves as a preface to the 
text. Wadding chose to include this text in his edition based 
on the testimony of John Pits (Johannes Pitseus, 1550–1616), 
who attributed to Duns Scotus a book on the Meteorologica 
(“librum unum”) in his literary history of England.4 While 
unwilling to treat the work as spurious (“licet Scoti esse 
non dissidam”), Wadding noted three elements that call into 
question the authenticity of the work: (1) Pits’ mention of a 
“librum unum” could mean that Scotus had written only on 
the first book of the Meteorologica, whereas the text treats 
all four books; (2) the text names Saint Thomas “beatus”, but 
Scotus died in 1308, long before the canonization of Saint 
Thomas in 1323; (3) the text also cites Thomas Bradwar-
dine’s Tractatus de proportionibus of 1328.
Wadding tried to offer ways of mitigating these elements: 
Pits could have meant a single volume, and not Book I of the 
3 R. P. F. Joannis Duns Scoti, Doctoris subtilis, Ordinis minorum Opera 
omnia (Lyon: Laurentius Durand, 1639), vol. III, 1–125 (reprinted in Op-
era Omnia [Paris: Vivès, 1891, vol. IV, 1–263]). 
4 Johannes Pitseus, Relationum historicarum de rebus anglicis (Paris: 
Rolin Thierry & Sebastian Cramoisy, 1619), vol. I, 393. 
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Meteorologica; “beatus” would be a simple sign of respect in 
use before the canonization of Thomas; and the information 
on Bradwardine’s life and works could be wrong. 
If, however, one would hold the work to be spurious, Wad-
ding proposed the name of Simon Tunsted (d. 1369), a Minor 
friar of Norwich who taught in Oxford, who is reported by 
the same source, John Pits, to have written a treatise on the 
Meteorologica, and who appears to have lived at the right 
time. We don’t know much about Tunsted, and the rest of the 
Franciscan historians who mention him only repeat Pits’s 
conclusions. There was little basis for Wadding’s conjecture. 
The text published by Wadding is a well-developed com-
mentary in the form of quaestiones on all the four books and 
its content is manifestly close to that of analogous works 
from the second half of the fourteenth century. Whoever the 
author may be, Wadding noted the value and importance of 
the work: “Tractatus porro doctus est, curiosus et perutilis, 
neque ullum vidi in hoc genere ab antiquis potiori, aut am-
pliori studio exaratum.” 
In spite of Wadding’s clear warnings, the text was attrib-
uted to Duns Scotus until the twentieth century. It made 
its career in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Scotism, 
when it was used as the basis for Franciscan courses on me-
teorology.5 Émile Pluzanski still quotes the text as authentic 
in his monograph on Duns Scotus from 1887.6
2. Heinrich Suter presented in 1882 a St. Gal manuscript of 
the Questions on Meteorology of Nicole Oresme and noted for 
the first time the similarity between Oresme and Scotus (i.e., 
Pseudo-Scotus).7 Oresme is believed to have lectured on the 
5 See, e.g., Livio Rabesano da Montursio, Cursus philosophicus ad 
mentem Doctoris Subtilis Ioannis Duns Scoti pro Tyronibus Scotistis plan-
iori stylo exaratus..., (Venice: apud Nicolaum Pezzanam, 1668), vol. II or 
Alipius Locherer, Clypeus philosophico-Scotisticus sive cursus philosophi-
cus juxta mentem et doctrinam Johannis Duns Scoti elaboratus (Viena: J. 
Erhart 1742), vol. III. 
6 É. Pluzanski, Essai sur la philosophie de Duns Scot (Paris: Ernest 
Thorin, 1888), 194 & passim. 
7 H. Suter, “Eine bis jetzt unbekannte Schrift des Nic. Oresme,” His-
torisch-literarische Abteilung der Zeitschrift für Mathematik und Physik 
27 (1882), 121–125. 
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Meteorologica in Paris sometime in the 1340s.8 Suter noted 
that a big part of the questions asked are “entirely the same.” 
This is hardly surprising; the similarity in the titles of the 
questions holds not only for the relationship between Ore-
sme and Pseudo-Scotus, but also for the entire literature on 
the Meteorologica produced in fourteenth-century Paris. 
3. Pierre Duhem has drawn attention to the importance of 
the meteorological literature of the fourteenth century for 
the development of medieval physics in several of his works. 
He was also the first scholar to take Wadding’s warnings 
seriously and treat Pseudo-Scotus as apocryphal in a note 
from 1905.9 But, surprisingly, Duhem welcomed Wadding’s 
conjecture regarding the attribution of the work to Simon 
Tunsted. He also noted the similarity between this text and 
the Parisian production of Nicole Oresme and Themon Ju-
daeus, an author he had uncovered.10 Duhem concluded that 
Pseudo-Scotus must have known Themon Judaeus and that 
he abbreviated his reasoning at times. Duhem also thought, 
based on the few extracts given by Suter, that Oresme must 
have made an abbreviation of Pseudo-Scotus, thus an abbre-
8 Based on W. J. Courtenay, “The early career of Nicole Oresme,” Isis 
(2000): 542-548. For Oresme’s works, see O. Weijers, Le travail intellectuel, 
vol. VII (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007), 168–190 and M. Clagett, Nicole Oresme 
and the Medieval Geometry of Qualities and Motions (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 645–646. Courtenay has established that Ore-
sme became Master of Arts in 1341–1342. 
9 “Sur le Traité des Météores faussement attribué à Duns Scot,” in 
Les origines de la statique, vol. I (Paris, Hermann, 1905), 326–335. Duhem 
notes at p. 327: “L’étude de ces Quatre livres sur les Météores ne révèle 
aucun détail qui ne se puisse fort bien accorder avec l’hypothèse émise ici 
par Wadding.” 
10 On Themon, see P. Duhem, “Thémon le fils du Juif et Léonard de Vin-
ci,” Bulletin italien 6 (1906): 97–124, reprinted in his Études sur Léonard 
de Vinci, vol. I (1906), 159–200; Le Système du monde, vol. VIII, 436–442 
and vol. IX, 71–73, 219–223, 313–314; H. Hugonnard-Roche, L’Oeuvre 
astronomique de Thémon Juif, maître parisien du XIVe siècle” (Geneva– 
Paris: Droz, Mignard, 1973). S. Nagel, “Astri e passioni dell’anima nel I 
libro delle Quaestiones in Metheororum di Timone,” in Parva Naturalia. 
Saperi medievali, natura e vita, Atti dell’XI convegno della societa’ italiana 
per lo studio del pensiero medievale, Macerata, 7–9 dicembre 2001, ed. by 
C. Cresciani, R. Lambertini and R. Martorelli Vico (Macerata, Pisa, Roma: 
Istituti Editoriali e Poligrafici Internazionali, 2004), 261–289. 
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viation of an abbreviation. Duhem therefore positioned Pseu-
do-Scotus as an intermediary between Themon and Oresme. 
Without giving much evidence, Duhem repeated in a sec-
ond article from 1910 that Themon’s questions are the “pro-
totype” for Pseudo-Scotus, Oresme and Buridan.11 From our 
reading of both texts, Duhem’s assessment that Pseudo-Sco-
tus had abbreviated Themon is at best an exaggeration (at 
least in what concerns the first three books, as we will show 
below). 
4. Aleksander Birkenmajer has rectified Duhem’s view in a 
study from 1921. Birkenmajer showed that a great deal of 
the material from Oresme’s Book III is also present in The-
mon Judaeus’s meteorology.12 He offered a thorough analysis 
of the relationship between Oresme, Albert of Saxony, Pseu-
do-Scotus and Themon based on a comparison of Book III of 
each work. Birkenmajer’s material suggests that we are deal-
ing with deeply entangled but still different works. Based on 
internal evidence that emerged from his analysis of Book III, 
Birkenmajer managed to establish a chronology of the works: 
Oresme would come first (before 1348, when he started his 
theological studies), Buridan, Albert of Saxony and Pseu-
do-Scotus would be intermediary works (1350s), and Themon 
would come last (late 1350s).13 A future and more thorough 
textual confrontation of all four books should further test the 
order proposed by Birkenmajer. In the meantime, there is no 
reason not to accept it. Regarding the relationship between 
Albert and Pseudo-Scotus, Birkenmajer maintains that one 
of them had access to the other and that both had access to 
Oresme’s commentary. In any case, we can retain that these 
works were taught very close to each other. 
11 “Sur les Meteorologicorum libri quatuor faussement attribués à 
Jean Duns Scot,” Archivium Franciscanum Historicum 3 (1910): 629. 
12 Studja nad Witelonem (Kraków, Nakładem Polskiej Akademji Umie-
jętności, 1921), trans. in Études d’histoire des sciences en Pologne (Wrocław, 
Warszawa, Kraków, Gdańsk: Zakład narodowy imienia Ossolińskich, wyd. 
Polskiej Akademii nauk, 1972), 178–239. 
13 For Buridan, cf. É. Faral, Jean Buridan, maître ès arts de l’Univer-
sité de Paris, Extrait de l’Histoire littéraire de la France, tome XXVIII, 2e 
partie (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1940), 87–100. Faral places at least 
part of the work just before 1358. 
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 5. Lynn Thorndike gave a new report on the manuscript 
literature of Pseudo-Scotus and Oresme in 1954–1955.14 He 
offered a comparison between the titles of the questions of 
Oresme and Pseudo-Scotus and concluded that they are dif-
ferent works (infirming Duhem). Concerning the chronol-
ogy, Thorndike followed Birkenmajer, saying that “it might 
seem probable that the pseudo-Scotus would antecede the 
Questions of Themon”. (In spite of this, Henri Huggonard–
Roche’s more recent study on Themon still followed Duhem 
and placed Pseudo-Scotus as posterior to both Themon and 
Oresme.)15 
Regarding the manuscripts of Pseudo-Scotus, Thorndike 
reports that five of the seven Oxford manuscripts attribute 
only the first three books on the Meteorologica to Duns Sco-
tus; one manuscript of the five (ms. 35, Oriol Coll., Oxford) at-
tributes the first three books to a “Scotus Junior” (“secundum 
Scotum Juniorem”—this could also refer to a production of 
the early career of Scotus); the oldest of the five manuscripts 
(ms. 80, Magdalen Coll., Oxford) attributes the first three 
books to a Scotulus (“secundum Scotulum”) and the fourth 
book to either an anonymous author or to the same Scotulus 
(“Anonymi an eiusdem Scotuli”).16 All these nicknames sug-
gest that we are dealing either with a Scotsman or with an 
early follower of Duns Scotus. 
Birkenmajer added yet another manuscript of Pseu-
do-Scotus, the only one to be found outside Oxford: ms. Q. 342 
ff. 69ra–130ra of the Amplonian Collection at Erfurt (UB Er-
furt, Dep. Erf. CA. 4° 342, incipit: “Utrum de impressionibus 
meteoricis sit scientia tamquam de subiecto”). This manu-
script was not reported in Schum’s catalogue of the Amploni-
14 L. Thorndike, “Oresme and Fourteenth Century Commentaries on 
the Meteorologica,” Isis 45 (1954) 145–152 and “More Questions on the 
Meteorologica,” Isis 46 (1955) 357–360. 
15 L’Œuvre astronomique de Thémon Juif, 39–50. 
16 Thorndike, “Oresme and Fourteenth Century Commentaries on the 
Meteorologica.” Thorndike is reading the descriptions from Coxe (H. O. 
Coxe, Catalogus codicum mss. qui in collegiis aulisque Oxoniensibus hodie 
adservantur, 2 vols., Oxford: e Typographeo academico, 1852).
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ana.17 Birkenmajer’s report on it suggests that this manu-
script is more trustworthy than the Oxford ones: it correctly 
presents questions 4 and 5 of Book III as separate, whereas 
they are collated by Wadding, who worked with two of the 
Oxford manuscripts. 
6. Concerning the authorship of Pseudo-Scotus, Birkenma-
jer perused Denifle and Chatelain’s Chartularium and found 
one author that fits the desired decade and name, a Johannes 
(de Plebis) Scotus.18 Unfortunately there is no other informa-
tion regarding this master that can corroborate Birkenma-
jer’s hypothesis. The nickname Scotulus could also have been 
used to designate a Scottish person of lesser standing than 
the Subtle Doctor, or simply to designate an abbreviation of 
a work by Scotus. In any case, they are common among the 
early Scotists. Pietro de Aquila (d. 1361), who was no Scots-
man, was also called Scotulus or Scotellus and could be a 
candidate; Antonius Andreae also went by Scotulus or Sco-
tellus (but he lived too early to be a candidate, ca. 1280–ca. 
1335?).19 We have no further indications. 
With the exception of Birkenmajer, most of the scholar-
ship written since Duhem has retained the name of Simon 
Tunsted, proposed by Wadding, for the text of Pseudo-Sco-
tus, in spite of the lack of any evidence supporting this at-
tribution. Even Thorndike retained the name of Tunsted, al-
17 A. Brikenmajer, Études d’histoire des sciences en Pologne, 228. W. 
Schum, Beschreibendes Verzeichniss der Amplonianischen Handschriften-
Sammlung zu Erfurt (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1887, 
reprinted Hildesheim: Olms, 2010). The description of this manuscript 
is now to be found in a preliminary version of Brigitte Pfeil’s revision of 
Schum, dated October 01, 2011, edited by the Digitale Bibliothek Thüringen, 
URL: http://www.db-thueringen.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=19048, 
accessed in May 2014. 
18 Birkenmajer, Études d’histoire des sciences en Pologne, p. 233, n. 
221. H. Denifle and É. Chatelain, eds., Auctarium chartularii Universitatis 
Parisiensis (Paris, 1894–1964), vol. I, coll. 161.
19 On the early Scotists, including Andreae, see C. Bérubé, “La première 
école scotiste,” in Preuves et raisons à l’Université de Paris. Logique, ontol-
ogie et théologie au XIVe siècle, ed. by Z. Kaluza, P. Vignaux, (Paris: Vrin, 
1984), 9–24. On Aquila and Andreae, see O. Weijers, Le travail intellectuel, 
vol. VII (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007), 128–129 and, respectively, vol. I (Turn-
hout: Brepols, 1994), 65–66. 
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though he was reading Brikenmajer. Hugonnard-Roche too 
compared the astrology of Themon with that of “Tunsted.” 
The Tunsted hypothesis was definitely laid to rest by 
Louis-Jacques Bataillon in 1976, who recovered Tunsted’s 
real meteorology in ms. Digby 153, fol. 28r –65v.20 Bataillon 
concludes that “les comparaisons que l’on peut faire entre 
les deux textes [i.e. Tunsted and Pseudo-Sctous] ne révèlent 
aucune parenté, au contraire.” Pseudo-Scotus thus reverted 
to anonymity.21 
7. Themon Judaeus’s meteorology was published several 
times and enjoyed a far-reaching popularity up to the sev-
enteenth century. There are three known publications that 
circulated: an incunabulum of about 1480 from Pavia;22 an 
edition where it is bound together with Aristotle’s Meteoro-
logica and a commentary by Gaetano da Thiene, published in 
Venice in 1496, 1507, 1515 and 1522;23 and George Lokert’s 
(ca.1485–1547) compilation of a complete course on nominal-
ist Physics “ad mentem Parisiensis,” printed in Paris in 1516, 
1517 and 1518, where Themon was published together with 
20 L. J. Bataillon, O. P., “Le commentaire sur les “Météores” de Simon 
de Tunstede, O.F.M.,” in Studies honoring Ignatius Charles Brady, Friar 
Minor, ed. by Romano Stephen Almagno, O.F.M. and Conrad L. Harkins, 
O.F.M (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1976), 45–56. 
21 L. J. Bataillon, op. cit., p. 55, marks the current status questionis: 
“Nous pouvons donc conclure [...] que l’auteur des intéressantes questions 
imprimées sous le nom de Duns Scot demeure pour le moment dans l’anon-
ymat. Il est à souhaiter que des travaux ultérieurs arrivent à donner un 
nom à ce maître de valeur.”
22 Thimon Judaeus, Questiones in Meteorologicam Aristotelis (Pavia, 
Antonius de Carcano: ca. 1480); Duhem’s copy is available online from the 
National Library of Israel. 
23 We were able to consult Gaietanus super Metheo. Habes solertissime 
lector in hoc codice libros metheororum Aristotelis Stragirite peripatheti-
corum principis cum commentarijs fidelissimi expositori Gaietani de Thie-
nis: vna cum duplici translatione vero Francisci Vatabli & antiqua: nouiter 
impressos: ac mendis erroribusque purgatos. Tractatum de reactione. Et 
tractatum de intensione & remissione eiusdem Gaietani. Questiones perspi-
cacissimi philosophi Thimonis super quatuor libros metheororum (Venice: 
s.n., 1522), Bibliothèque Mazarine de l’Institut (miscatalogued under the 
Greek Pyrrhonian Timon of Phlius). 
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Albert of Saxony’s Physics and De Coelo, Buridan’s De anima 
and Parva naturalia, and Lokert’s On proportions.24
On this, we can report that Lokert’s edition of Themon, 
on which all scholars of Themon have been working so far, 
including Pierre Duhem and Edward Grant, is missing the 
first question, “Utrum de impressionibus meteorologicis sit 
scientia,” which is a standard first question to ask in such 
works. This question appears nevertheless in the previous 
Italian editions and in ms. Vat. Lat. 2177 held by the Apos-
tolic Library. Lockert’s edition is visibly based on a different 
manuscript than the previous Italian editions; aside from the 
missing question, there are minor differences in the text. 
8. Since Duhem’s work on Themon, there has been an impor-
tant evolution in our knowledge concerning this author: two 
astronomical disputations by him have been recovered in the 
Amplonian collection at Erfurt (mss. F. 313 and F 380, under 
Thimon Erfurtensis). They were signalled, although without 
a description, by Thorndike, in 1934, and Hugonnard-Roche 
edited one of them on the motion of the moon.25 Duhem had 
lost track of Themon after the latter left Paris with a mission 
for Pope Innocent VI in 1359. We now know that he ended up 
in Erfurt in 1350 and that he held these disputations “apud 
Schotos,” that is, at the Benedictine “Schottenkloster” of that 
city (the Abbey of Saint Jacob, founded by Irish and Scot-
tish missionaries).26 Not only that, but he became rector of 
this school. Could this have favoured the confusion in the 
manuscripts between Scotus/Scotulus (Pseduo-Scotus) and 
24 Questiones et decisiones physicales insignium virorum: Alberti de 
Saxonia in octo libros physicorum. Tres libros de celo & mundo. Duos lib. 
de generatione & corruptione. Thimonis in quatuor libros Meteororum Bu-
ridani in Aristotelis. Tres lib. de anima Lib. de sensu & sensato Librum de 
memoria & reminiscentia Librum de somno & vigilia. Lib. de longitudine 
& brevitate vite Lib. de juventute & judicio magistri Georgii Lokert Scoti: a 
quo sunt tractatus proportionum additi (Paris: s.n., 1516). 
25 A history of magic and experimental science, 8 vols. (New York: Mac-
millan, 1923–58), vol. III (1934), 587–588. H. Hugonnard-Roche, L’Œuvre 
astronomique de Thémon Juif.
26 See J. Scholle, Das Erfurter Schottenkloster (Düsseldorf: Schwann, 
1933). 
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Themon? Themon reappears again at the Sorbonne, with a 
career in the Faculty of Arts; his trace is lost in 1371.27
Themon’s meteorology appears to be addressed to a 
Parisian audience, given his geographical references. Hu-
gonnard-Roche dates it after his return from Erfurt, thus 
with 1350 as terminus post quem.28 Birkenmajer dates the 
work after 1370 (posterior to Pseudo-Scotus, dated by him 
after 1355).29 
9. On a closer inspection of both Pseudo-Scotus and Themon 
Judaeus, we can report the following contamination. Pseu-
do-Scotus as published by Wadding consists in fact of two 
texts. The first text covers Books I–III of the Meteorologica 
and are by an anonymous author (Scotulus). The work bears 
a resemblance in style and arguments with Themon that 
does not go beyond the resemblance normally found in the 
Meteorologica literature of the time. The second text, cover-
ing part of Book IV, is a copy of questions 1–4 of Themon 
Judaeus’s Book IV. They are different copies of the same text, 
as shown by the small variations of words. The Wadding text 
ends Book IV in the middle of Themon’s q. 4 (Utrum digestio 
sanguinis et nascentia a calori naturali sit pepansis), inter-
rupting a sentence. A note in Wadding tells us that some text 
appears to be missing (“Aliqua videntur adhuc deesse”). The-
mon’s text, as we have it from the Venice and Paris editions, 
continues the text of Book IV of Pseudo-Scotus with the rest 
of q. 4, and adds four other questions. Thus Wadding’s Pseu-
do-Scotus added an incomplete copy of Themon’s Book IV to 
a treatise on Books I–III by someone else.
The separation between the two works, that cover-
ing Books I-III and that covering Book IV, is confirmed by 
Thorndike’s report on the Oxford manuscripts. According to 
Thorndike, in ms. 93, Balliol Coll., the fourth book comes first 
(96ra–107ra), before Books I–III (108ra–148va), so that the 
ending of Book III “Expliciunt questiones super tres libros 
27 H. Hugonnard–Roche, L’Œuvre astronomique de Thémon Juif, 11–
23. 
28 L’Œuvre astronomique de Thémon Juif, 39. Themon mentions sev-
eral times the geography of Paris. 
29 A. Birkenmajer, Études, 238.
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metheororum secundum Scotum doctorem subtilem” only 
applies to the first work (Books I–III).30 Ms. 80, Magdalen 
Coll. also separates the two texts, but conjectures that Book 
IV could be by the same Scotulus. 
II. Doctrinal commentary. 
Utrum de meteorologicis sit scientia 
As Thorndike and Kibre have noticed, any collection of ques-
tions on Meteorologica is susceptible of beginning with the 
question “Utrum de impressionibus meteoricis sit scientia 
(tanquam de subjecto)”.31 Buridan, Oresme, Themon, Albert 
of Saxony, and Pseudo-Scotus make no exception. This kind 
of question sprung from thirteenth-century discussions on 
the scientific character of theology and is common as an in-
troduction to a particular science. 32 The material covers the 
scope of meteorology, its subject matter as distinct from that 
of other natural philosophical disciplines, and its status as 
an Aristotelian demonstrative scientia. The exposition usu-
ally concludes with remarks on the probable character of me-
teorology, owing to the instability of meteorological bodies: 
meteorology is a science that, although it strives for the ideal 
of an Aristotelian demonstrative science, can only attain it 
partially. 
Fourteenth-century texts usually mention in this con-
text the much-debated issue of the object of scientific knowl-
edge developed on both sides of the English Channel from 
the 1320s onwards. The main rival epistemological theories 
concerning the object of science are known: is the object the 
conclusion of a syllogism, is it the thing in itself, or is it the 
total significate of the conclusive proposition (significabile 
complexe)? In spite of having received considerable attention 
from scholars, there is still much ground to be covered in 
this dossier. The transmission of ideas from Oxford to Paris 
30 “More Questions on the Meteorologica,” Isis 46 (1955):360. 
31 L. Thorndike, P. Kibre, A Catalogue of Incipits of Medieval Scien-
tific Writings in Latin (London: The Medieval Academy of America, 1963), 
1640. 
32 See the classical study of M.-D. Chenu, La théologie comme science 
au XIIIe siècle (Paris: Vrin, 1943). 
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remains little known and there are many unanswered ques-
tions concerning the paternity of particular arguments and 
their circulation from one master to another. Much of the 
results in tracing filiations remain provisional, waiting for 
advancements from textual criticism and history. With this 
caveat noted, the presentation of Pseudo-Scotus’s treatment 
of the object of meteorology will allow us to shed more light 
on what we believe to be the common opinion held in Paris 
in the second half of the century, a position developed as a 
result of the rejection of Gregory of Rimini’s notion of the 
adequate significate of a proposition (significabile complexe). 
The Parisian masters, from Buridan to Pseudo-Scotus, The-
mon and up to Marsilius of Inghen, maintain the following 
view: the conclusion of the demonstration is the immediate 
object of scientific knowledge, the terms of the conclusion are 
the remote object, and the things signified by those terms are 
the final, but most important, object. I take this opinion to be 
a development of Ockham, mediated by Buridan. Thus Pseu-
do-Scotus, who presents, often in an abbreviated form, the 
main of the arguments of this debate, is a valuable witness 
of the development of Parisian nominalism. 
Meteorology as an Aristotelian scientia
The answer to the literal question, “is there a [proper, Aristo-
telian] science of the meteors,” is far from mysterious and all 
authors will arrive at a positive conclusion. The question had 
its tradition in the Paris curriculum before the import of the 
views on the object of scientific knowledge from Oxford. Siger 
of Brabant’s discussion from the thirteenth century (“utrum 
de impressionibus possit esse scientia”) offers a summary of 
the material inherited by fourteenth-century authors. Siger 
argued from a strictly Aristotelian perspective: the subject 
of meteorology is universal, incorruptible, real and not arti-
ficial. Most importantly, meteors have properties (passiones), 
and something that has properties can be scientifically inves-
tigated by deriving those properties from known principles. 
Therefore a science of meteorological phenomena is possible, 
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answered Siger, even though these phenomena are ephem-
eral and most of the time lack present existence.33
Pseudo-Scotus recites the same view: 
Prima [conclusio] est, quod de impressionibus Mete-
oricis est scientia, tanquam de obiectis. Probatur, quia 
tales impressiones habent causas determinatas, pro-
prias passiones, et principia, per quae istae passiones 
possunt de iis demonstrari.34
This is one side of the answer that will endure through the 
fourteenth-century literature: meteorology is an Aristotelian 
demonstrative science as established in the Posterior Analyt-
ics. It does not come without arguing. A first series of contra 
arguments, seeking to show the epistemological weakness of 
meteorology, revolve around probability and certitude. 
(1) It is claimed that one can only arrive at insecure no-
tions or at mere opinions regarding the meteors (“notitia 
cum formidine ad oppositum” is the technical term, a notion 
with fear that the opposite may also be true).35 The limits of 
meteorology as a demonstrative science from a priori princi-
ples are usually admitted here. Pseudo-Scotus will concede 
that about certain meteors, such as the comets and the Milky 
Way, we can only have opinions, and not scientia. But, he 
adds, there are only a very limited number of such phenom-
ena; about most meteors “we have true notions”—although 
we can’t attain in natural science the kind of certitude we 
can have in mathematics or optics (one can invoke for sup-
port here a famous passage from Aristotle, Met. ―, 3, 995a 
33 Siger’s questions on meteorology are unedited, but F. Van Steen-
berghen, Siger de Brabant d’après ses oeuvres inédites, 2 vols. (Louvain: 
Éditions de l’Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1931–1942), vol. I, 233, pro-
vides a summary of the solution. 
34 Pseudo-Scotus, In I Meteor., q. 1, 8, ed. Wadding, p. 7a. 
35 Idem, p. 3a: “Arguitur quod non, quia de impressionibus solum 
habetur notitia cum formidine ad oppositum; ergo, etc.” See also Themon, 
In I Meteor., q. 1 (ed. 1522), p. 87a: “Queritur primo utrum de impres-
sionibus meteorologicis sit scientia. Et arguitur primo quod non, quia de 
omnibus impressionibus est solum vaticinium coniectura et divinatio vel 
opinio: ergo de illibus non est scientia. Consequentia patet, quia scientia 
est habitus certus omnibus demonstrate sine formidine.”
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14–16).36 Themon is even more pessimistic on this point, con-
sidering that Aristotle’s Meteorologica books are an aggre-
gate of a few proper demonstrations amidst many opinions 
and conjectures.37 
(2) Interestingly though, the probabilism attested by the 
previous argument is counter-balanced by another contra 
argument. Meteorology depends heavily on empirical obser-
vations; the experience of the senses that testify of meteo-
rological phenomena is far more secure than any scientific 
notion we can have, given the infirmity of our intellect in 
our current state. The generally shared principle invoked is 
experientia sensus est notita dignior quam scientia. But Aris-
totelian science does not consist solely of pure observations. 
Pseudo-Scotus answers that empiricism, on its own, does not 
yield an Aristotelian science, which consists instead in the 
interpretation of the experiences gathered. We are to add a 
“scientific notion” to the experience of the senses, by search-
ing for the proper causes of those experiences, as Aristotle 
teaches.38 
Another series of contra arguments is drawn from the 
specific character of the material that meteorology deals 
with. (3) The ephemeral status of the meteors, already en-
countered in Siger, suggests that there can be no knowl-
edge of things that are not present when the knowledge is 
acquired—e.g., lightning, thunder, or the rainbow. About 
these, Pseudo-Scotus holds that we will have a “provisional 
science” (scientia conditionalis) that remains to be verified, 
and not a proper affirmative demonstrative science.39 (4) A 
36 In I Meteor, q, 1, 8, p. 8a: “[...] concedo quod quantum ad aliqua, quae 
demonstrantur in ista scientia, solum habetur notitia cum formidine ad 
oppositum, sicut de Cometis, Galaxia; sed de aliis vera habetur notitia, et 
conclusio ad tertium librum licet non habeatur notitia ita certa, sicut in 
Mathematica et perspectiva.”
37 Themon, Questiones..., op. cit., (ed. 1522), p. 87c. 
38 In I Meteor, q, 1, 8, p. 8a: “Nam quantum ad quod est hujusmodi 
impressionum habemus experientiam sensus, et scientifice inquirimus 
causas ipsarum.”
39 In I Meteor, q, 1, 8, p. 8a: “Ad quartam [quia hujusmodi impressiones, 
ut in presentibus non sunt, sicut patet de tonitru, fulmine, iride, et hujus-
modi], dico quod quaecumque non sunt hujusmodi impressiones, de iis est 
solum scientia conditionalis, et non categorica affirmativa demonstratio.”
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classical argument is taken from the inordinate character of 
meteorological phenomena, to which Pseudo-Scotus will de-
vote a long separate question: meteors appear to arise from 
violent motions, they are produced against nature and they 
are impossible to predict.40 Buridan and Themon give a vari-
ation of this argument: meteorological phenomena happen a 
casu vel a fortuna, whereas science is about necessary phe-
nomena (scientia est de necessariis).41 Pseudo-Scotus insists 
on the causal order of production, which is necessary for any 
science looking for the causes of phenomena: if the order is 
changed, the science acquired on the basis of the old order of 
phenomena will be falsified (mutato ordine, mutabitur, sive 
falsificatur scientia). The answer returns to the mixed char-
acter of meteorology: some meteors are generated violently 
(e.g., thunder strike is not part of the natural inclination of 
fire), while some are generated naturally (rain drops arise 
because of gravity, a natural inclination of water). But all 
meteors, even the violently generated ones, are part of the 
general order of creation, just like any other body of the uni-
verse, even though their motions are more difficult to discern 
than the motion of celestial bodies. There is less order in the 
meteors, but less order does not mean no order at all.42 
The nominalist challenge
To this predictable set of arguments, Pseudo-Scotus adds a 
new problematic drawn from the Ockhamist tradition. The 
basis for considering meteorology an Aristotelian demonstra-
tive science being laid, we are now faced with epistemological 
issues that apply to all sciences. It is said by others, reports 
Pseudo-Scotus, that the meteors cannot make the object of 
40 Idem, q. 2, “An impressiones Meteoricae fiant per naturam inordina-
tiorem ea natura, quae est propria elementorum?”
41 Buridan, In 1 Meteor., q. 1, 1, ed. Bages, p. 3: “Item de causalibus et 
fortuitis non est scientia, 2o Physicorum [Physics, II, 5]. Hec autem sunt 
casualia et fortuita quia extra semper et frequenter, ut tonitrua, fulmina, 
motus terre, stelle comate, ergo.” Themon, ibidem, p. 87a: “Impressiones 
fiunt a casu vel a fortuna [...] consequentia tenet: quia scientia est de nec-
essariis quod non possunt aliter se habere: sed casualia et fortuita possunt 
aliter se habere.”
42 Pseudo-Scotus, In I Meteor., q. 2, pp. 8b–13a. 
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science because they are things outside of the mind (res extra 
animam). We recognize the basis of this objection in the Ock-
hamist notion that science deals with mental discourse. The 
reason why things outside of the mind cannot be the subject 
of proper science is that in this way, one and the same thing 
can become the object of science, belief and opinion at the 
same time (eadem ratione, simil): for instance, about God we 
can know that He exists and at the same time doubt that He 
is one and believe that He is trine:
Sexto, quia si res extra animam esset objectum sci-
entiae, eadem ratione esset credulitatis, quia idem 
videtur judicium de utroque. Consequens est falsum, 
nam tunc idem simul et semel posset sciri, opinari et 
credi; et ita posset de eodem error esse et ignorantia. 
Sicut, verbi gratia, de Deo possumus scire ipsum esse, 
et dubitare ipsum esse unum, et credere ipsum esse 
trinum.43 
This argument had been made by Gregory of Rimini in 
the Prologus of his Sentences on behalf of Ockham’s position:
Secundo, si res esset obiectum scientiae totale, ut 
nunc de obiecto loquimur, eadem ratione res extra es-
set obiectum opinionis et fidei et erroris, et per con-
sequens contingeret quod idem homo idem sciret et 
opinaretur et crederet et etiam ignoraret ignorantia 
dispositionis quae error nominatur; quae omnia sunt 
absurda. Patet consequentia, nam contingit eundem 
scire quod deus est aeternus, opinari quod solus et 
immediate moveat coelum, credere quod sit trinus in 
personis, errare putans quod sit in vigore finitus.44
43 Ibid., q. 1, 1, pp. 3b–4a. 
44 Gregory of Rimini, In I Sent., prol., q. 1, in Lectura super primum et 
secundum Sententiarum, vol. I, ed. by A. D. Trapp and V. Marcolino (Berlin, 
New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1981), 7. See also, for the origins of the argu-
ment, M. Grabmann, “De quaestione ‘utrum aliquid possit esse simul cred-
itum et scitum’ inter scholas augustinismi et aristotelico-thomismi me-
dii aevi agitata,” in Acta hebdomadae augustinianae-thomisticae (Turin, 
Rome: Marietti, 1931), 110–139. 
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The argument is meant to show that the distinction be-
tween the intellectual acts of scientific knowledge, faith and 
opinion needs a distinction between their objects. The claim 
is not that the singular thing is not the object of science, faith 
and opinion, taken separately, but that something more be-
sides the singular thing of the world must be posited in order 
to distinguish these intellectual acts. 
We are now inside the vaster nominalist problematic on 
what is the proper object attained by scientific knowledge. 
The different theories on this matter are usually mentioned 
at this point in the corresponding texts of the other Parisian 
masters mentioned in this essay, but Pseudo-Scotus’s treat-
ment is by far the most extended and thorough. He reports on 
the main arguments developed before him, discusses Grego-
ry’s theory of a significabile complexe as the object of science, 
and lays down his own view. Buridan, for instance, does not 
mention the theory of the significabile complexe in this place, 
while his critique of Gregory on this point is well known 
from other places in his corpus.45 Buridan goes straight to 
the solution, without arguing: that there are three objects of 
science, the demonstrated conclusion, the terms that com-
pose the conclusive sentence and the things signified by the 
terms.46 Themon, for his part, argues briefly that just as the 
sensible things are the ultimate object of sensation, so the 
things outside of the mind are the ultimate object of scientific 
knowledge, on the basis of the principle sicut in sensu, ita et 
in intellectu.47 
Let us briefly recall here the main traits of the epistemo-
logical debate on which Pseudo-Scotus takes position. This 
45 On Buridan’s refutation of Gregory, see J. Biard, “Les controverses 
sur l’objet du savoir et les “complexe significabilia” à Paris au XIVe siècle,” 
in S. Caroti, J. Celeyrette, eds., Quia inter doctores est magna dissensio. Les 
débats de philosophie naturelle à Paris au XIVe siècle (Florence: Olschki, 
2004), 1–31.
46 Buridan, In I Meteor., q. 1 (ed. Bages, p. 5).
47 Themon, In I Meteor., q. 1 (ed. 1522, p. 87): “Prima conclusio: quod 
impressiones meteorologice sunt obiectum ultimatum notitie scientifice 
que est de ipsis. Probat, quia res sensibiles sunt obiectum ultimatum sen-
sitivarum notitiarum et non species sensibiles nec complexe signifiabile 
nec aliquid aliud [...] sicut in sensu, ita et in intellectu.” 
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discussion has been brought to scholarly attention by Hubert 
Élie’s pioneering study on Gregory’s notion of the complexe 
significabile (1936).48 Our historical representation of it has 
suffered a number of revisions since then, the most impor-
tant of which is the attribution of the theory to Adam Wode-
ham rather than Gregory, by Gedeon Gál (1977).49 As far as 
historians of medieval logic are concerned, the problem of 
the object of scientific knowledge is a question of the bearer 
of truth and falsity (is it the proposition which carries that 
function, is it the res extra, or is it the total significate of the 
proposition, the significabile complexe?).50 The discussion is 
initially developed in the theological literature over the Sen-
tences, where it was important to determine the differences 
between the subject of science and that of faith, in order to 
clarify the distinction between the two disciplines (“Utrum 
theologia sit scientia una de Deo tamquam de subjecto”).51 
48 H. Élie, Le complexe signifiable (Paris: Vrin, 1936), reedited as Le 
Signifiable par complexe. La proposition et son objet. Grégoire de Rimini, 
Meinong, Russell (Paris: Vrin, 2000).
49 G. Gál, “Adam of Wodeham’s question on the ‘complexe significa-
bile’as the immediate object of scientific knowledge,” Franciscan Studies 
37 (1977): 66–102. Among the bibliography devoted to the subject: P. Vi-
gnaux, “La problématique du nominalisme médiéval peut-elle éclairer des 
problèmes philosophiques actuels?” Revue philosophique de Louvain 75 
(1977): 293–331, puts the notion into perspective, as does A. de Libera, La 
référence vide. Théories de la proposition (Paris: PUF, 2002); G. Nuchel-
mans, Theories of the proposition. Ancient and medieval conceptions of the 
bearers of truth and falsity (Amsterdam, London: North-Holland, 1973) 
discusses the panorama of views; E. J. Ashworth, “Theories of the prop-
osition: some early sixteenth century discussions” Franciscan Studies 38 
(1978): 81–121, reprinted in Studies in post-medieval semantics (London: 
Variorum, 1985), presents the aftermath in the sixteenth century; texts be-
longing to this discussion are gathered in D. Perler, Satztheorien: Texte zur 
Sprachphilosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie im 14. Jahrhundert (Darm-
stadt : Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1990); J. Biard, “Les controver-
ses sur l’objet du savoir,” op. cit., offers a good summary. 
50 According to E.J. Ashworth, “Theorie of the Propositions: Some 
Early Sixteenth Century Discussions,” op. cit., there is a cluster of three 
questions at stake: the question over the object of scientific knowledge, the 
question over the bearer of truth and falsity, and the question over what is 
the significate of a proposition. One answer should satisfy all three. 
51 There are more precise theological roots of the discussion, some of 
which are discussed by Nuchelmans, Theories of the proposition, 177–194 
(on theological arguments leading up to Ockham and Holkot’s complexum 
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But soon enough, the epistemological question invades all 
disciplines: logic, physics, metaphysics, and, as we have seen, 
even meteorology. In doing so, it carries along with it the cog-
nitive discussion over the relationship between the intellec-
tual act of knowing, the object of knowledge and the real ob-
jects of the world specific to fourteenth century nominalism, 
and measures it against the requirements of an Aristotelian 
demonstrative science codified by the Posterior Analytics. 
Thus an answer to this question aims at securing, ultimately, 
the inherited notion of scientia: how can we attain a science of 
necessary and unchanging things by grasping only a limited 
number of particular things—or not even those, but merely 
their signs?52 Briefly put, in terms of a long durational his-
toriography, the challenge facing the Parisians was how to 
maintain the Aristotelian understanding of science after the 
Ockhamist linguistic turn.
The beginnings of this discussion are situated in late 
1320s–early 1330s Oxford, in the debates surrounding Ock-
ham’s epistemology. The question is still “what is the subject 
of this science (tanquam de subjecto)?” The thirteenth-cen-
tury vocabulary distinguished between the esse subjectivum 
of the res in itself and the esse objectivum of the res in/as an 
object of the mind. The subject of a science is the material 
it deals with (e.g., the mobile body, the imperfect mixtures, 
the meteors; for the Ockhamist, this will be the term that 
has the function of grammatical subject in the sentence 
that concludes the demonstration). The object of a science is 
that in which the intellectual act of knowing terminates, in 
the sense in which we speak of objects of the senses as that 
which the senses touch.53 Although there is a fluctuation of 
the terms subjectum and objectum scientiae in the literature 
and they are often used indiscriminately, it is the object that 
we are looking in this questions, that which terminates the 
theory). For the Franciscan context, see O. Bychkov, “The Nature of Theol-
ogy in Duns Scotus and his Franciscan Predecessors,” Franciscan Studies 
66 (2008): 5–62.
52 Élie asks, op. cit., 15: “Le Venerabilis Inceptor se doutait-il qu’il allu-
mait ainsi un incendie qui allait durer jusqu’à la fin du moyen âge?” 
53 See L. Dewan, “Obiectum: Notes on the Invention of a Word,” Ar-
chives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 48 (1981): 37-96.
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act of knowing (illud quod scitur). For Ockham, the immedi-
ate object of science is the propositional content at which it 
arrives, that is, the conclusions of the scientific demonstra-
tions. A conclusion is a proposition, called a complexum or 
complexum mentale; it is complex because it is composed of 
simple terms; it is also mental because it is independent of 
its vocal utterance.54 Against this Ockhamist position, his 
critic Walter Chatton raised an important and far-reaching 
objection: knowledge and faith had better attain the things 
in themselves, not some mental construct; faith in God 
should aim at God, not at a proposition. Chatton thus held, 
against Ockham, that both the act of knowing and the act of 
assenting have the things outside of the mind as their object, 
and not the “complex signification of the thing outside of the 
mind.” Chatton’s critique of Ockham became known in Paris 
probably through Adam Wodeham and Gregory of Rimini.55
The initial Oxford debate was thus whether the object of 
science is the res extra or the signa, the res significata or the 
complexum significationis. We recognize here the question 
54 See Ockham, In I Sent., prol.,  q. 9 in Opera theologica (Saint 
Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1967), vol. I, 266 and Expositio 
in lib. phys. Aristotelis, prol., §3 in Opera philosophica (Saint Bonaventure, 
NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1985), vol. IV, 9: “Nam obiectum scientiae est 
tota propositio nota, subiectum est pars illius propositionis, scilicet termi-
nus subiectus. Sicut scientiae qua scio quod omnis homo est susceptibilis 
disciplinae, obiectum est tota propositio, sed subiectum est iste terminus 
‘homo’.” It would be tedious to send the reader to the numerous commen-
tators of this view; for Ockham’s conception of science, I rely mostly on 
R. Guelluy, Philosophie et théologie chez Guillaume d’Ockham (Louvain, 
Paris: Nauwelaerts, Vrin, 1947), still valid, who comments closely on the 
Prologue of the Ordinatio; for his epistemology, on C. Michon, Nominal-
isme: La théorie de la signification d’Occam (Paris: J. Vrin, 1994) and C. 
Panaccio, Le discours intérieur: de Platon à Guillaume d’Ockham (Paris: 
Seuil, 1999); Ockham’s evolution on the issue of the ontological status of 
mental concepts does not concern the present discussion. 
55 I only summarize the main points of the more developed Oxford 
discussion; see G. Nuchelmans, Theories of the proposition, 195–225; K. 
Tachau, “Wodeham, Crathorn and Holcot: The development of the com-
plexe signifiable,” in L.M. de Rijk, H.A.G. Braakhuis, eds., Logos and 
Pragma. Essays in honour of Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans (Nijmegen, 
1987), 161–187; K. Tachau, Vision and Certitude at the Age of Ockham 
(Leiden: Brill, 1988), 202–208; J. Biard, “Les controverses sur l’objet du 
savoir,” 2–8, for the Oxford debate between Ockham, Holkot, Chatton, 
Crathorn and Burley. 
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posed by Pseudo-Scotus on whether science attains the res 
extra animam mentioned earlier. Between these two alterna-
tives, a third alternative was developed by Adam Wodeham 
and championed on the continent by Gregory of Rimini, who 
commented on the Sentences in 1343–1344.56 Although Adam 
is now believed to have been the initiator of the theory, I will 
insist on Gregory, who was the primary source for the Pari-
sian discussion and was followed closely by Pseudo-Scotus. 
The view put forward by Adam and Gregory is that the sig-
nification of a proposition is distinct from both the material 
sentence (i.e., from the terms that compose it) and from the 
things signified by the sentence. It is the significatum totale 
or adaequatum of the sentence that makes the object of sci-
entific knowledge.57 Assent cannot be given to the proposi-
tion alone, argued Gregory, against Ockham: it can only be 
given to the fact that the proposition is in agreement with 
the signified things as they are in the world. The total and 
adequate signification of the proposition “Deus est” is “Deum 
esse,” the fact that God is. These total and adequate signifi-
cations are true or false even if there is no sentence uttered 
to signify them (Deum esse does not cease to be true once the 
sentence has been said), and so they are called significabiles 
or enuntiabiles; they are also called complex, for they require 
56 See Adam’s text edited by Gál “Adam of Wodeham’s question on the 
‘complexe significabile’as the immediate object of scientific knowledge,” op. 
cit.; now in the edition of Adam’s Lectura secunda in Librum primum Sen-
tentiarum, R. Wood, G. Gál, eds., 3 vols. (Saint Bonaventure, NY: 1990), vol. 
I, 180–198. On Gregory, see G. Leff, Gregory of Rimini. Tradition and inno-
vation in XIVth-century thought (Manchester: University Press, 1961); on 
his career, see V. Marcolino, “Der Augustinertheologe an der Universitaet 
Paris,” in H. A. Oberman, ed., Gregor von Rimini. Werk und wirkung bis 
zur Reformation (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1981), 127–194; on his theory, see P. 
Bermon, L’assentiment et son objet chez Grégoire de Rimini (Paris: Vrin, 
2007), who provides a recent and extended commentary. Cf. also M. Del 
Pra, “La teoria del “significato totale” della proposizione nel pensiero di 
Gregorio da Rimini,” Rivista critica di storia della filosofia 11 (1956): 287–
311 and V. Wendland, “Die Wissenschaftslehre Gregors von Rimini in der 
Diskussion,” in Gregor von Rimini. Werk und wirkung bis zur Reformation, 
242–300. 
57 Gregory, In I Sent. prol. q. 1, ed. Trapp–Marcolino, 12: “Nec conclusio 
demonstrationis, nec res aliqua est obiectum, sed significatum adaequa-
tum conclusionis.” 
The threefold object of the scientific knowledge 487
a sentence in order to be signified, a complexum of terms. 
In simple speech, the technical term significabile complexe 
stands for the significate of a proposition.58 
Pseudo-Scotus inherits thus from this discussion three 
viae: according to one via, the subject of science is the known 
conclusion (this is labelled as the Ockhamist position by Gre-
gory; but it is rather the Ockhamist position as critiqued by 
Chatton, or Holkot’s position);59 another via is that of the sig-
nificabile complexe (Adam Wodeham and Gregory of Rimini); 
and a third via is that of the things signified through the 
terms of the known conclusions (Chatton’s view).60 
This is the status questionis on which an author was 
supposed to give his opinion. After exposing the arguments, 
mainly based on Gregory, Pseudo-Scotus arrives at what he 
takes to be a reconciliatory position—but one that, as we will 
see, is actually a development of the second view.Pseudo-Sco-
tus seems to be very much aware of Gregory of Rimini’s ar-
guments: he uses his arguments when exposing the problem, 
but he argues nevertheless against Gregory’s position, in the 
same camp with Buridan. Chronologically, Pseudo-Scotus 
should have had direct access to both these authors, but it is 
safer to assume that he was drawing from a common pool of 
known arguments. The fact that Pseudo-Scotus reports what 
appears to be an abbreviation of Gregory’s arguments testi-
fies to the deep influence that Gregory had in the Parisian 
milieu.
58 For the prehistory of these terms, see P. Bermon, L’assentiment et 
son objet, 117–125.
59 See H. Schepers, “Holkot contra dicta Crathorn, II: Das ‘significa-
tum per propositionem’. Aufbau und Kritik einer nominalistischen Theorie 
ueber den Gegenstand des Wissens,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 79 (1972): 
106–136 and Mario dal Pra, “La proposizione come oggetto della conos-
cenza nel pensiero di Roberto Holcot,” in Logica e realtà: momenti del pen-
siero medievale (Bari: Laterza, 1974), 83–119.
60 In 1 Meteor., q. 1, pp. 4–5: “In ista quaestione videbitur secundum 
viam triplicem, quid est subjectum scientiae [...] Est una via quae ponit 
subjectum scientiae est ipsa conclusio scita [...] Alia via est, quod objectum 
scientiae est significabile complexe per conclusionem scitam [...] Pro tertia 
via sit conclusio ista: Res significatae per terminos conclusionis scitae sunt 
objecta scientiae.” 
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Refutation of the “Ockhamist” position
Whether conclusions are the object of scientific knowledge or 
not, it is argued for as follows. 
(1) The first via argues that truth and falsity can only be 
applied to propositions, not to things in themselves. Things 
in themselves cannot be qualified as true or false; on the con-
trary, a demonstrative scientific conclusion can only be de-
rived from true propositions. If science is about true things, 
on the basis of the principle nihil scitur nisi verum, then only 
propositions can be true. 
The refutation provided attacks on the principle nihil sci-
tur nisi verum: Pseudo-Scotus maintains that one can know 
things without qualifying them as true or false.61 Gregory 
had made the same point on behalf of Ockham (via Adam, 
via Chatton). 62
(2) A second argument claims directly that a general sci-
ence of singular things is impossible. Science works with uni-
versal notions; the object of universal science can be a) a uni-
versal conclusion, q.e.d., b) a universal, but they do not exist, 
or c) the singular thing signified by the conclusion. Singular 
things however cannot make the object of universal notions: 
there is no reason to consider this particular triangle as the 
object of the universal notion of ‘triangle’ rather than that 
particular triangle. Once again, Pseudo-Scotus is drawing on 
Gregory.63 Unlike Gregory though, who can oppose to this ar-
61 In 1 Meteor., q. 1, 6, p. 6b: “Apertum est quod nihil scitur nisi verum, 
tanquam conclusio scita, tamen aliquid scitur verum, tanquam res signifi-
cata per subiectum conclusionis scitae, quando tum neque est verum, nec 
falsum.” 
62 Gregory, In 1 Sent. prol. q. 1, a. 1, p. 2: “Prima [ratio] est, quoniam 
nihil scitur nisi verum, sola autem propositio est vera, igitur sola proposi-
tio scitur, et nonnisi conclusio. Igitur, etc.” See Ockham’s treatment of this 
principle from In I Sent., d. 2, q. 4, Opera theologica, vol. II, 135–140. 
63 Pseudo-Scotus, In 1 Meteor., q. 1, 2, p. 4a: “Secundo, quia objectum 
scientiae universale vel est ipsa conclusio universalis, et habetur intentum; 
vel est ipsa res signata per terminos istius conclusionis, et tunc vel res uni-
versalis, et hoc non, cum nulla talis sit; vel res singularis, et hoc non, quia 
qua ratione una res singularis est objectum istius notitiae, eadem ratione 
alia, et per consequens nulla res est objectum istius.” Gregory, In 1 Sent., 
prol., q. 1, a. 1, p. 2: “Secundo, obiectum scientiae demonstrationis uni-
versalis est conclusio illius demonstrationis, igitur et cuiuslibet scientiae 
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gument the theory of the significabile complexe, Pseudo-Sco-
tus replies with a traditional view: the object of universal 
conclusions are indeed all singular things to which that con-
clusion applies, singular things of which the universal notion 
yields a confused concept. The universal concept of ‘homo’ 
is caused by a limited number of singular human, and yet 
through it we have a confused concept of all human beings 
in the world.64 
(3) A third argument for the Ockhamist position is drawn 
from the knowledge of figments. The object of a known con-
clusion such as “The hircocervus is not a chimera” cannot 
be the thing outside of the mind signified by it, because it 
does not exist; therefore it has to be the proposition itself. 
The reification of imaginary objects such as chimeras is a po-
sition developed initially in Oxford but also taught in Paris, 
by Marsilius of Inghen for instance. According to this view, 
the complex concept of a hircocervus is not simply the juxta-
position of the simpler concept of a half-goat with the simpler 
concept of a half-stag, but something distinct from the two. 
This is not the view that Pseudo-Scotus follows: he opts for 
the alternative opinion, associated with Buridan and Albert 
of Saxony, according to which the object of a chimera is noth-
ing more than the sum of the objects of its components. Only 
existing objects signify: there is no void reference.65 
per demonstrationem acquisitae obiectum est conclusio demonstrationis 
illius. Assumptum probatur, quia vel ipsa conclusio universalis est obiec-
tum illius scientiae, et habetur propositum, vel res extra animam. Sed hoc 
esse non potest, quia nec res universalis, cum nulla sit huiusmodi, nec res 
singularis, quia non potius una quam alia significata per subiectum con-
clusionis [est obiectum].”
64 In 1 Meteor., q. 1, 6, p. 6a: “Dico quod objectum conclusionis univer-
salis est quaelibet res singularis significata per objectum istius conclu-
sionis, quia quaelibet talis apprehenditur per conclusionem universalem, 
saltem conceptu confuso.”
65 In 1 Meteor., q. 1, 6, p. 6b: “Dico quod objectum istius [hircocervi] est 
caput Draconis, cauda Leonis, corpus Equi, vel sic de hujusmodi.” See J. Bi-
ard, Logique et théorie du signe au XIVe siècle (Paris: Vrin, 1989), 229–231; 
A. de Libera, La référence vide, 99–109, and E. J. Ashworth, “Chimeras and 
Imaginary Objects: A Study in Post-Medieval Theory of Signification,” Vi-
varium 15 (1977): 55–79. See also J. Biard, “La signification d’objets imag-
inaires dans quelques textes anglais du XIVe siècle,” in P.O. Lewry, ed., 
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(4) Another argument is drawn from the principle that 
assent necessarily follows a known true notion. This can lead 
an Ockhamist to think that the object of a known scientific 
notion and the object of assent are one and the same (idem 
est id quod scimus et id cui assentimus). If id quod scimus-
=id cui assentimus, we fall back on the previously mentioned 
case that propositions are the object of both, because only 
propositions can be true, and we assent to what is true. An 
objector needs therefore to deny the identification between 
the object of knowledge and the object of assent: we assent to 
propositions, but we know things.66
Two further arguments are laid down that attack the cog-
nitive mechanism of a science of conclusions, both of them 
drawn from Gregory. (5) If the object of science were the con-
clusion, it would follow that one has a reflexive act accompa-
nying one’s act of knowing every time one knows something. 
However, such a reflexive act applied to what we know is 
very rare, and most of our scientific knowledge does not ter-
minate in a reflection over what we have come to know, but in 
the things signified.67 (6) Admitting that the conclusive sen-
tence is the object of knowledge and is apprehended by the 
intellect, one asks: is this apprehension complex or simple 
(incomplex)? Scientific knowledge cannot be obtained solely 
from simple apprehensions of singulars, for science does not 
satisfy itself with pure empiricism: scientific knowledge joins 
evident principles or predetermined knowledge with simple 
apprehensions. We cannot be dealing with complex appre-
hensions either. A complex apprehension grasps a proposi-
The Rise of British Logic (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 
1983), 265–283, for the Oxford discussion. 
66 In 1 Meteor., q. 1, 6, p. 6b: “Negatur, quia illud scimus tanquam ob-
jectum scientiae, quod significatur per partes illius cui assentimus.”
67 In 1 Meteor., q. 1, 3, p. 4b: “Contra istam opinionem opponitur, quia 
si conclusio esset objectum scientiae habitae per conclusionem, sequere-
tur quod quilibet actu sciens haberet actu cognoscendi conclusionem. Con-
sequens falsum, quia nunquam, vel raro habemus actum reflexum super 
nostram cognitionem, quamvis saepe cognoscamus.” Cf. Gregory, In 1 Sent. 
prol. q. 1, a. 1, p. 4: “Nam plerumque, immo quasi semper contingit quod 
demonstrans, quamvis formet conclusionem, non tamen actu reflectitur 
super illam apprehendendo ipsam, sed directe figit suum aspectum in id, 
quod ipsa significat.”
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tion together with its relationship to the signified things, 
and judges their conformity to one another. That means that 
the complex apprehension intrinsically bears a truth value 
(apprehensio judiciaria is Gregory’s term). That would auto-
matically make the conclusion true, which is more than we 
want: we know in fact many conclusions without knowing 
their conformity with things, such as the conclusions of geo-
metrical demonstrations.68
The significabile complexe and the eternal truths
The second way reported by Pseudo-Scotus argues that the 
object of the proposition “Man is able to laugh” (Homo est ris-
ibilis) is neither man, nor laughter, but the state of affairs of 
“man being able to laugh” (Hominem esse risibilem). This is 
Gregory’s position. The main argument for the significabile 
complexe relies on the already encountered analogy between 
sensorial knowledge and scientific knowledge: when I feel 
hot fire, through this experience I know not only fire and not 
only hotness, but I know the fact that fire is hot (ignem esse 
calidum).69 The knowledge of the centre of the circle to which 
68 In 1 Meteor., q. 1, 3, p. 4b: “Secundo, si conclusio esset objectum, 
tunc conclusio apprehenderetur ab intellectu, et tunc quaeratur, utrum 
apprehensione incomplexa, vel complexa? non incomplexa, quia talis non 
est scientia, cum sit acquiribile ab intelletu de quocumque complexo, vel 
incomplexo. Modo scientia non acquiritur sine evidentia alicujus prin-
cipii, vel experientiae, praedeterminante intellectum. Non complexa, quia 
maxime esset talis conclusio vera: sed illud est falsum, quia multoties sci-
mus, et cognoscimus per conclusiones, cum non consideramus de veritate, 
vel de falsitate earum.” Gregory, In 1 Sent., prol. q. 1, pp. 4–5, renders 
Pseudo-Scotus’s last claim intelligible: “Si dicatur quod conclusio appre-
henditur apprehensione iudiciaria et enuntiativa, hoc erit, ut videtur, 
apprehensio, qua cognoscitur ipsa conclusio esse conformis rei seu esse 
vera, nam nulla alia videtur esse ad propositum; sed certum est quod non 
quilibet demonstrans habet talem notitiam de sua conclusione. Unde nec 
geometra demonstrans latera trianguli descripti secundum doctrinam pri-
mae conclusionis Primi Euclidis esse aequalia considerat vel apprehendit 
quod conclusio, quia enuntiat illa esse aequalia, est vera.” See also the 
same argument made by Marsilius of Inghen, In 1 Sent. q. 2, a. 3, in Quaes-
tiones super quattuor libros “Sententiarum,” ed. M. S. Noya (Leiden: Brill, 
2000), vol. I, 79. 
69 In 1 Meteor., q. 1, 4, p. 5a: “Alia via est, quod objectum scientiae 
est significabile complexe, per conclusionem scitam, sicut objectum istius, 
Homo est risibilis, est, hominem esse risibilem, quod probatur, quia objec-
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the geometer arrives is the same knowledge that a quarry-
man has; and yet this quarryman does not have knowledge 
neither of the geometrical proposition that signifies the cen-
tre of the circle, nor of the circle in itself: he only knows the 
situation of the centre of the circle. 
Against the significabile complexe, the arguments mobi-
lise the ontological question of whether it is something dis-
tinct from the signified thing or not. An Aristotelian princi-
ple is invoked in order to certify that “to be the same” (esse 
ipsum) and “the same” (ipsum) are identical (Metaph. 1017a 
27–30 and 1029b 13–15): Deum esse=Deus.70 If indeed the 
complex signifiable were something distinct from God, it 
would follow that it is a co-eternal thing, not created by God 
and therefore independent from God and not submitted to 
His will and power. God cannot destroy the signifiable “Deum 
esse,” for it would destroy himself.71 
This argument from the co-eternal and independent 
truths became the main tool used by the Parisians against 
Gregory. Marsilius of Inghen has a more elaborate version of 
it, which can explain its force. The question Marsilius asks is: 
“utrum ‘Deus esse’ est aliquid vel pure nihil.” If it is nothing, 
“as master Gregory says,” there can be no science of things, 
and the object of science would be a pure non-being, which 
tum notitiae habitae per experientiam est tale significabile complexe; igi-
tur est cujuslibet alterius notitiae. Consequentia tenet, quia ubique vide-
tur judicium idem esse. Et antecedens patet, quia si sentiam ignem esse 
calidum, per istam experientiam non solum cognosco ignem, nec solum 
caliditatem, sed cognosco ignem esse calidum.”
70 In 1 Meteor. q. 1, 4, p. 5a: “Contra istam viam arguitur, primo, quia 
vel tale significabile complexe est res distincta a re significata, vel non. Si 
sic, contra, primo per Aristotelem 5. Metaphysic. ubi dicit quod in dictis 
secundum se, idem est esse ipsum, et ipsum, sicut idem est esse Deum, et 
Deus.” Cf. Marsilius, In 1 Sent., q. 2, ed. Noya, pp. 81–82: “Et ergo tenendo 
suppositionem est prima propositio haec contra hanc opinionem: ‘Deum 
esse est Deus.’ Probatur primo sic auctoriate Philosophi 7 Metaphysicae 
dicentis: ‘In dictis secundum se est idem ipsum et esse ipsum.’ Sed manife-
stum est quod de Deo dicitur esse secundum se; igitur esse Deum est Deus 
vel Deum esse est Deus.”
71 In 1 Meteor. q. 1, 4, p. 5a: “Secundo, quod si esset tale distinctum, se-
queretur quod est aliquod ens coaeternum cum Deo, quod Deus, nec posset 
augmentare, nec diminuere, nec annullare, dato quod Deus esset infiniti 
vigoris, sicut concedimus ipsum esse.”
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sounds upsetting to the scientist. If the proposition “Deum 
esse” is something though, distinct from God, it follows that 
we must concede two original principles (duo prima), which 
sounds upsetting to both philosophers and Catholics. To ex-
plain this last consequence: the fact that God is the first in-
complex thing needs no comment; in addition, there seems 
to be an order between the signifiables too, for “man having 
a rational soul” seems to be prior to “man being able to be 
educated,” such that one can be said to be the cause, and the 
other, the effect; we are now in a causal chain of significa-
bilia: we must look for the first cause or an original singnifi-
cabile, since there can be no infinite causal regress; it cannot 
be God, for God is simple; it cannot be dependent on God (non 
sit a Deo), for then God could destroy the signifiable “Deum 
esse” and still be, i.e. it would still conserve its significance 
“God is” (a paradoxical formulation of the argument made by 
Pseudo-Scotus that, if the signifiables were independent of 
God, than God could not destroy “Deum esse”); the original 
signifiable must therefore be an original complex indepen-
dent thing. Thus we arrive again at the upsetting conclusion 
of having two original principles: “Deum esse” is a truth inde-
pendent from God and as equally necessary as God.72
The idea that co-eternal truth exists alongside God is cir-
culated in Paris on lists of articles condemned under the title 
“quod multae fuerunt veritates ab aeterno quod non erant 
Deus.” This condemned article was signalled by Hubert Élie 
as part of a presupposed theological condemnation of 1340, 
not to be found.73 Surprisingly, Alain de Libera has retraced 
the article back to the Parisian condemnation of January 
1241 initiated by William of Auvergne against the “other” 
nominalists, the twelfth-century logicians .74 It is a rare and 
interesting connection between the two currents. It is clear 
that this thesis preoccupied logicians at least since Philip the 
72 Marsilius, In 1 Sent., q. 2, ed. Noya, 83–84. 
73 Élie, Le complexe significabile, 72. 
74 A. de Libera, La référence vide, 177–187 (“D’une condamnation 
fantôme : la pseudo-censure parisienne de 1340”). Chartularium Univer-
sitatis Parisiensis, ed. H. Denifle and É. Chatelain, vol. I (Paris: Delalain, 
1889), 170.
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Chancellor’s Summa de bono, who argues against it in his 
treatment of the transcendental truth.75 
The eternal truths argument is revived against Gregory’s 
complexe significabile by Buridan, Pseudo-Scotus, Marsilius, 
Pierre d’Ailly, Paul of Venice up until the sixteenth century.76 
But it is quite an unfair case to make. Marsilius’s question, 
“utrum ‘Deum esse’ est aliquid vel pure nihil,” intentionally 
ignores Gregory’s discussion of the three senses of being for 
which he is best remembered. Gregory had laid down this 
theory of the three senses of being precisely as a pre-emp-
tive defence against this kind of ontologization of the signifi-
cabile complexe. Aliquid, res or ens, as synonymous terms, 
are said in three ways according to Gregory: “in a first sense, 
very generally (communissime), any signifiable, complex or 
incomplex, true or false, is said to be [or: is called] a thing or 
something”; “in a second sense, these terms are used for any 
signifiable, complex or even incomplex, but true, that is, by 
means of a true expression”; “in a third sense, these terms 
are understood as signifying an essence or an existing en-
tity.” 77 The first sense of “something” is a general sense indif-
ferent both truth/falsity and to existence; the second sense 
is indifferent only to existence, not to truth or falsity; and 
75 See H. Pouillon, “Le premier traité des propriétés transcendantales. 
La «Summa de bono» du Chancelier Philippe,” Revue néo-scolastique de 
philosophie 61 (1939): 40–77. For William of Auvergne, see N. Lewis, “Wil-
liam of Auvergne’s Account of the Enuntiable: its Relations to Nominalism 
and the Doctrine of the Eternal Truths,” Vivarium 33 (1995): 113–136.
76 See A. de Libera, La référence vide, loc. cit. and E.J. Ashworth, “The-
ories of the proposition,” op. cit. 
77 Gregory, In 1 Sent., prol., q. 1, pp. 8–9: “Ad primum dicendum quod 
hoc nomen ‘aliquid’ sicut et ista alia sibi synonyma ‘res’ et ‘ens’ possunt 
accipi tripliciter: uno modo communissime secundum quod omne significa-
bile incomplexe vel complexe, et hoc vere vel false dicitur res et aliquid [...] 
Alio modo sumuntur pro omni significabili complexe vel etiam incomplexe, 
sed vere, id est per veram enuntiationem; quod autem false, tantum dici-
tur non ens. [...] Tertio modo sumuntur ista ut significant aliquam essen-
tiam seu entitatem existentem [...] Nunc ad argumentum, cum quaeritur, 
utrum illud totale significatum sit aliquid vel nihil, dico quod, si ‘aliquid’ 
sumatur primo vel secundo modo, est aliquid; si vero tertio modo sumatur, 
non est aliquid. Unde hominem esse animal non est aliquid, sed est homi-
nem esse substantiam animatam, sensibilem, rationalem; nec hominem 
esse risibilem est aliquid, sed est hominem posse ridere.” 
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the third sense is indifferent to neither: it must be both true 
and existent. The purpose of Gregory’s distinction is to sepa-
rate the third sense of “something,” that of an existent being 
in the world, from the other two senses of “something,” that 
are said without regard to whether they exist or not. The to-
tal significate of the proposition can be said to be something 
(aliquid, res or ens) only in the first and second sense, but not 
in the third sense: it is not an existent being in the world. In 
Gregory’s terms, it is a non-existent being, but is not “noth-
ing”.78 Granted, this can give way to paradoxical readings, 
and Marsilius famously complains about the non-intelligi-
bility of something that is not a substance, nor an accident, 
nor nothing.79 Nevertheless, Gregory’s intention to exclude a 
reading of the signifiables as existing entities in the outside 
world is clear. Gregory’s critics, by making the argument that 
the signifiables co-exist alongside God, understand them in 
the third sense: they co-exist in the same sense in which God 
exists, something that Gregory denies explicitly.80
78 Idem, p. 9: “[...] Sed ulteriorem consequentiam nego, qua dicitur “igi-
tur scientia nullum habet obiectum”, nam habet obiectum, quod non est 
ens.”
79 Marsilius, In 1 Sent., q. 2; ed. Noya, p. 81: “Hic modus de significa-
bilibus complexis distinctus a rebus incomplexis vel est adeo subtilis quod 
imaginationem communium excedit et praesertim meam, vel fortassis est 
ex ignorantia logicae introductus.” To grasp the distinction that Gregory 
makes between the third sense of being and the first two, Alain de Li-
bera has proposed to think of it in terms of a distinction between “being 
eternally,” which the signifiables are not, in spite of the critique mounted 
against them, and “being true eternally”, which the signifiables are, as 
contingent truths dependent upon God’s understanding (La référence vide, 
pp. 219–221; see also Gregory in In 1 Sent., d. 38, q. 2, ed. Trapp-Marcolino, 
vol. 3, 304).
80 In this sense, Pascale Bermon argues, against Élie and Nuchelman’s 
reading, that, because the signfiables are not an existing entity, Gregory is 
not a “conceptual realist,” a forerunner of the twentieth-century ontology 
of the object (L’assentiment et son objet, pp. 181–184); she rightfully points 
out that in denying an ‘existing entity’ to the significabile complexe, Gre-
gory acts as a perfect nominalist. Alain de Libera reexamines the connec-
tions between Gregory and twentieth century philosophy in La référence 
vide. André de Muralt sees in Gregory’s theory a development of the Sco-
tist notion of objective being (L’enjeu de la philosophie médiévale [Leiden: 
Brill, 1993], 128).
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The third way: direct realism
Following Pseudo-Scotus’s exposition, we are left with a 
third solution to the problem of the object of science: the res 
extra itself. The idea that external things are the objects of 
scientific knowledge is supported through the analogy with 
sensation: just as the object of vision is not the species, which 
moves the sense of sight immediately, but the external thing 
which causes the species, so the object of scientia is not the 
conclusion, which is directly known, but the external thing 
that it signifies.81 Pseudo-Scotus applies this example to me-
teorology: when we know that the rainbow is caused by the 
refraction of the rays of light, this cognition does not end 
neither in the conclusion that the rainbow is caused by the 
refraction of the rays of light, nor in the signifiable of the con-
clusion, but in the rainbow itself, out of which the cognition 
of this conclusion is ultimately derived. 
The threefold object solution
The thesis adhered to holds that science has a threefold ob-
ject: the known conclusion is the immediate object; the “no-
titia incomplexa terminorum,” the terms of the proposition 
constitute the “more mediated” object; the things outside of 
the mind are the ultimate object of science, in which the no-
tions of the terms terminate and out of which the conclusions 
are ultimately derived. Pseudo-Scotus claims to present 
a synthesis of the three positions (concordando istas opin-
iones). This is misleading. It is not a synthesis of the three 
ways, because what he presents as the agreement omits 
the significabile complexe, replacing it with the terms of the 
proposition. Although he uses the term “significabile per con-
clusionem,” which may suggest the significabile complexe, he 
then explains it as “the incomplex notion of the terms”: 
81 Pseudo-Scotus, In 1 Meteor., q. 1, 5, p. 5b: “Pro tertia via sit con-
clusio ista: Res significatae per terminos conclusionis scitae, sunt objecta 
scientiae. [...] Istud apparet in exemplo, nam objectum sensationis, sicut 
visionis, non dicitur species, quae immediatae movet visum; sed objectum 
dicitur res ad extra, sicut paries, vel aliquod hujusmodi, a quo causatur 
ista species.”
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Sciendum tamen, concordando istas opiniones, quod 
quidlibet istorum potest dici obiectum scientiae, scili-
cet tam conclusio scita, quam significabile per conclu-
sionem, quam etiam res significata per ipsum. Unde 
conclusio potest dici obiectum, eo quod ipsa imme-
diate obiicitur intellectui: sed de notitia incomplexa 
terminorum est scientia, tanquam de subiecto magis 
mediato, sed ultimate. Res extra est obiectum, a quo 
aliae notitiae tam terminorum, quam conclusionis 
derivantur.82
The thesis secures access to the external thing, mediated 
by the terms of the proposition and further mediated by the 
proposition itself. Marsilius offers, again, a development of 
the argument—as a refutation of Gregory, correctly, and not 
as a “synthesis” of the three views. He speaks of the proxi-
mate object (the proposition), the remote object (the terms as 
signs) and the most remote or ultimate object, the things in 
themselves:
Tertio suppono quod obiectum assensus immedia-
tum est propositio; remotum, eius termini inquantum 
signa sunt rerum; et remotissimum et ultimatum et 
etiam maxime intentum est res incomplexa signifi-
cata per terminos, saltem in affirmativis de inesse et 
de praesenti. 83
For instance, Marsilius explains, the immediate object 
of the knowledge and assent to the proposition “God is” is 
the proposition itself; the middle-way object (remotum) is the 
term “God” as a sign for the First Being; the last object (remo-
tissimum) is the First Being itself. 
The thesis arises in Paris therefore as a refutation of Gre-
gory, which wanted to refute Ockham, so we have the impres-
sion of sort of a linear development. This is not the case. The 
thesis of the threefold object of science is actually a return 
to Ockham, in a circular development. Marsilius states: “this 
82 In 1 Meteor., q. 1, 5, p. 6a.
83 Marsilius, In 1 Sent., q. 2, a. 3, ed. Noya, p. 78. See also Quaestiones 
super libros Priorum analyticorum (Venice, 1516), lib. I, q. 1. The fist text 
speaks of the object of assent, while the second text speaks of the object of 
knowledge: they are the same for Marsilius. 
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appears to be the opinion of many people and especially that 
of Ockham in the fourth question of his Prologue and it is the 
common opinion.”84 It is unclear to which passage Marsilius 
wants to refer his readers. Rather than the fourth question of 
Ockham’s prologue, which deals with the derivation of prop-
erties from the prime subject, the ninth question, on “Utrum 
Deus sub propria ratione deitatis sit subiectum theologiae,” 
seems a more appropriate reference (as the editor notes). 
Ockham’s answer distinguishes between the subject as “that 
which supposits” (pro illo quod supponit) and the subject as 
that which is supposited (pro illo pro quo supponitur). God 
is the subject of theology, if by subject we understand the 
significate (illo pro quo supponitur), in an improper manner; 
but God is not the subject of theology, if by subject we under-
stand the signifier (pro illo quod supponit), as we normally 
do. The term “God” acts as a sign, a concept that is directly 
connected to the thing outside of the mind, the First Being.85 
Ockham can avoid accusations of scepticism with reference 
to the idea that the conclusion is the object of science, of the 
kind that are raised in this debate, through his theory of per-
sonal supposition, which guarantees the connection between 
the term and the res extra.86 Marsilius, writing a generation 
after Gregory, can fully appreciate this, and can present the 
84 Marsilius, In 1 Sent., q. 2, a. 3, ed. Noya, 79: “Haec videtur esse mens 
multorum et praesertim Ockham in quarta quaestione prologi et est com-
munis opinio.” 
85 Ockham, In 1 Sent., prol., q. 9, in Opera theologica, vol. I, 268–269: 
“Et dico, primo, quod accipiendo subiectum pro illo quod supponit, quod 
Deus sub ratione deitatis non est subiectum theologiae nostrae. Hoc patet, 
quia subiectum isto modo dictum est terminus conclusionis. Sed Deus non 
est terminus conclusionis, quia illud est terminus conclusionis quod imme-
diate terminat actum intelligendi vel est actus intelligendi. Sed Deus in se 
non immediate terminat actum intelligendi sed mediante aliquo conceptu 
sibi proprio, nec est conceptus. [...] Secundo, dico quod accipiendo subiec-
tum pro illo pro quo supponitur, sic respectu alicuius partis Deus sub ra-
tione deitatis est subiectum [...] Hoc patet, quia in aliquibus veritatibus 
terminus primo supponit pro ipso Deo in se, sicut in ista: Deus creat, Deus 
est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, et sic de aliis. In aliquibus terminus 
primo supponit pro Patre, sicut in istis: Pater generat, Pater constituitur 
ex paternitate. Et sic de Filio et Spiritu Sancto et creatura. Sed illud pro 
quo supponitur est subiectum isto modo dictum, improprie loquendo.”
86 See (at least) P. Boehner, “Ockham’s Theory of Supposition and the 
Notion of Truth,” Franciscan Studies 6 (1946): 261–292. 
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thesis of the threefold object of science as derived from Ock-
ham’s theory of supposition. 
A question of priority remains to be settled. The thesis 
of the threefold object of science has been associated with 
Marsilius of Inghen in the literature, and it is apparently 
through Marsilius that it has been transmitted to the nomi-
nales of the fifteenth century.87 Marsilius lectured on the 
Sentences in Heidelberg in 1392–1394, but he started his 
theological studies sometime around 1366 in Paris and could 
have gathered material around that time. His dates are thus 
close to the presumed dates of Pseudo-Scotus (1350s). But it 
is unlikely that the latter knew of Marsilius’s commentary, 
for he doesn’t report any of the otherwise interesting argu-
ment he contributes to the discussion. More importantly, the 
thesis of the threefold object of science is in circulation at 
least since Buridan, who reported it in several places, includ-
ing his Meteorology: (1) Buridan presents the threefold sense 
of the scibile—which is the basis for the threefold object of 
science thesis—in his An. Post. I, q. 2: the proposition is the 
scibile primum et immediatum, the terms of the proposition 
are a second sense of the scibile, and the signified things are 
a third sense.88 (2) Buridan applies the threefold object the-
87 E.g., A. de Libera, La référence vide, 190 speaks of “la théorie de 
Marsile de Inghen, devenue au XVIe siècle la ‘thèse commune’ ” (he is bas-
ing this on Ashworth). H. Élie, Le complexe signifiable, 56–57, maintains 
that Marsile takes the thesis directly from Ockham, without offering any 
proof. According to the indexes of the Franciscan Institute edition, a tri-
partite distinction of the scibile in Ockham is not to be found. See also S. 
Lalla, Secundum viam modernam: ontologischer Nominalismus bei Bar-
tholomäus Arnoldi von Usingen (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 
2003), 315–318, for Usingen’s attribution of the thesis to Marsilius. 
88 Buridan, In I An. Post., q. 1, 6 in Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in 
duos libros Aristotelis Posteriorum Analyticorum, unpublished transcript 
by H. Hubien, URL: http://individual.utoronto.ca/pking/resources/buridan/
QQ_in_Post_An.txt (May 2014): “Et tunc sciendum est quod triplex est 
‘scibile’, scilicet per demonstrationem. Primum et immediatum scibile est 
conclusio demonstrabilis, quae ex eo dicitur sciri quia ex praemissis notis 
concluditur. Secundo modo, ‘scibilia’ dicuntur ex quibus conclusio demon-
strabilis componitur. Unde, sicut dicimus nos scire talem conclusionem et 
eam nobis esse demonstratam, ita saepe dicimus tale praedicatum esse 
scitum et demonstratum de tali subiecto. Deinde, tertio modo, scibilia sunt 
res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium, et ita dici-
mus nos habere scientiam de animalibus et lapidibus, de deo et intelligen-
tiis, et sic de aliis.”
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sis in the first question of his commentary on the Physics I, 
saying that the demonstration does not consist in just the 
conclusion, but also in the terms that compose the conclusion 
together with their significate.89 (3) His Meteorology then uses 
the thesis fully, in the same way as Pseudo-Scotus.90 
Conclusion 
We can now locate the valuable questions on meteorology 
published by Wadding with a little more precision in the Pa-
risian intellectual setting of the second half of the fourteenth 
century. The Parisian discussion of the object of science sug-
gests the following chronological sequence. As far as we know, 
Buridan is probably the initiator of the theory of the threefold 
object of science maintained by all Parisian masters associ-
ated with him whom we have discussed in this essay.91 The 
fact that when Marsilius reports the threefold object thesis, 
he presents it as an Ockhamist position, suggests that the 
perception of Ockham’s on the matter has evolved since Gre-
gory’s critique of the conclusion thesis (via Oxford). Initially, 
Ockham is read by someone like Gregory (indirectly, through 
Adam’s report on Chatton’s critique) as proposing that the 
object of science is the conclusion of a syllogism, with the 
skeptical danger that this prevented access to the res extra. 
89 Buridan, In I Phys., q. 1, in Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum 
Aristotelis, ed. J. Dullaert (Paris, 1509, reprint Frankfurt am Main: Miner-
va, 1964), fo. IIva: “Ad demonstrationem autem plura concurrunt, scilicet 
premisse et conclusio et termini ex quibus constituuntur premisse et con-
clusiones, et res significatae per illos terminos, et de omnibus illis dicitur 
haberi scientia.”
90 Buridan, In I Meteor., q. 1, ed. Bages, p. 5: “De secunda dubitatione, 
dicendum est Primo posteriorum quod tripliciter potest esse de aliquibus 
scientia: uno modo, tamquam de conclusionibus demonstratis que sunt 
scibilia, propria et propinqua; alio modo, tamquam de terminis ex quibus 
ille conclusiones componuntur; et tertio, tamquam de rebus per terminos 
conclusionum significatis.”
91 T.K. Scott, “John Buridan on the objects of demonstrative science,” 
Speculum 40 (1965): 654-673, shows that Buridan used the older theory of 
natural supposition to oppose Ockham’s view that demonstrative proposi-
tions are to be considered as hypothetical (“Man is able to laugh” should be 
read as “if a man exists, it is able to laugh”). This is a side issue; Buridan 
seems to me to stay close to Ockham’s understanding of personal supposi-
tion with his use of the threefold scibile as a mean to reach the objectivity 
of knowledge. 
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While arguing against Gregory’s theory of the significabile 
complexe, Buridan and his intellectual circle, including The-
mon, Pseudo-Scotus and up to Marsilius, developed the the-
ory of the threefold object of science. This theory is then read 
back into Ockham’s theory of supposition, and rightfully so, 
at least by someone like Marsilius. It is worth thus noting 
that a consequence of the general rejection of Gregory’s the-
ory of the significabile complexe is a deeper appreciation of 
Ockham: Marsilius’s threefold object thesis presents a truer 
Ockham than that of Gregory. By the sixteenth century, the 
discussion of the total significate of the proposition became 
a standard topic in commentaries on the Posterior Analytics, 
and the nominalist threefold object solution became the most 
common opinion.92  
The solution developed by the Parisian masters justifies 
the study of language as part of the study of nature. Marsi-
lius asks: what would be the purpose of studying the terms, 
other than to grant epistemic access to their reference?93 
From the point of view of securing the Aristotelian demon-
strative science, the threefold object thesis has the obvious 
advantage of granting access to both contingent things (the 
ultimate object) and to necessary propositions (the imme-
diate object): we can say necessary truths about changing 
things. In forging this view, Parisian philosophers adapted 
to what was asked of them. In addition to condemning the 
significabile complexe, the Statute of the Parisian Faculty of 
Arts of 29 December 1340 asked from its scholars a realist 
opinion about science as being, ultimately, about things, not 
about signs: 
92 See E.J. Ashworth, “Theories of the proposition,” who investigates 
Thomas Bricot, Juan Celaya and Antonio Coronel. 
93 Marsilius, In 1 Sent., q. 2, a. 3, ed. Noya, p. 79: “Quae enim esset 
cura homini de cognitione orationis vel terminorum, nisi eis mediantibus 
haberet cognitionem rerum incomplexarum per terminos significatarum?”
Lucian Petrescu502
Quod nullus dicat scientiam nullam esse de rebus 
que non sunt signa id est que non sunt termini vel 
orationes quoniam in scientiis utimur terminis pro 
rebus quas portare non possumus ad disputationes. 
Ideo scientiam habemus de rebus licet mediantibus 
terminis vel orationibus.94
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94 Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. H. Denifle and É. Cha-
telain (Paris: Delalain, 1891–1899), vol. II, n. 1042. This article should be 
coupled with the articles condemning the significabile complexe: section VI 
of the Statute of 29 December 1940 (“quod nullus asserat [...] quod Deus 
et creatura nihil sunt”) and Autrecourt’s “semantic” articles condemned in 
1346 (31 and 57: “quod Deus et creatura non sunt aliquid”; 58: “quod signi-
ficabile complexe per istud complexum ‘Deus et creatura distinguuntur’ 
nihil est”). For more details on the condemnation of the complexum signi-
ficabile in Paris, see Élie, Le complexe significabile, 37–40 (who saw Autre-
court as a scapegoat for Gregory), R. Paqué, Das Pariser Nominalistensta-
tut: Zur Entstehung des Realitätsbegriffs der neuzeitlichen Naturwissen-
schaft (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1970), esp. 198 –232, K. Tachau, Vision 
and certitude, 353–357 and J.M.M.H. Thijssen, “The ‘semantic’ Articles of 
Autrecourt’s Condemnation. New Proposals for an Interpretation of the 
Articles 1, 30, 31, 35, 57 and 58,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire 
du Moyen Âge 57 (1990): 155–175.
